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1 Introduction1 
Widespread tax evasion reflected in persistent public resistance to pay is seen as an important 
part of the problem of raising local government revenue in Tanzania.2 The measures 
prescribed for addressing the non-payment problem are to build administrative capacity in the 
local authorities to enhance revenue collection (URT, 1996, 1999; PriceWaterhouse, 1998), 
and to educate and mobilise taxpayers (Bukurua, 1991; URT, 1991). But dealing with the 
policy problem of revenue enhancement and tax evasion also requires some understanding of 
the factors underlying the individual’s decision whether to pay or evade taxes. However, 
taxpayers’ views have to a large extent been ignored in this policy debate. What are the 
reflections, experiences, priorities and recommendations of Tanzanian citizens with respect to 
payment of taxes and fees? What do people feel they get in return for taxes paid? And what 
do they consider to be the major challenges to improving the present system? Based on data 
from a recently conducted citizen survey, this paper presents the views of ordinary people on 
local government taxation.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework for analysing 
tax compliance. The methodological approach and organisation of the empirical study are 
presented in section 3. Section 4 presents citizens’ views on taxation, compliance and service 
delivery. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2 Understanding tax compliance3 
In the standard economic model of taxpayer behaviour, the perceived quality of government 
does not influence the level of taxes remitted. The basic behavioural assumption is that 
people are free riders: no one will voluntarily contribute to the government unless the threat 
of punishment makes it sensible (Allingham & Sandmo 1972). But an increasing amount of 
evidence from experimental studies and survey data reveals that the rate of contribution to a 
public good is affected by factors such as citizens’ trust in others and perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of the government (Slemrod, 2003).  
 
As Scholz (1998:137) points out, without trust there is little basis for social co-operation and 
voluntary compliance with laws and regulations that could potentially benefit everyone. 
Thus, without trust coercion provides a reasonable guide for governance. The temptation not 
to comply even if others do comply defines the free-riding problem that is endemic in 
collective action situations in private as well as public institutions (Hardin 1982). Why 
should the taxpayer not take advantage of the opportunity for a free ride? In this perspective, 
Levi (1998) argues that citizens are likely to trust the government only to the extent that they 
believe that it will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair and reasonable, and that 
their trust of the state and others is reciprocated. She stresses that government 
                                                 
1 This article is the result of co-operative research between Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), the Norwegian 
Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR), and Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). The 
research is financially supported by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) through 
the research programme Formative process research on the local government reform in Tanzania.  Earlier 
versions of the paper were presented at workshops in Dar es Salaam organised by REPOA in March and August 
2004. I would  like to thank the workshop participants for constructive comments. Thanks also to Karl Pedersen and Arne 
Wiig for useful comments, to Florida Henjewele, Geoffrey Mwambe and Knut Nygaard for excellent research assistance, 
and to Erasto Ngalewa for facilitating the study. Points of view and possible errors are entirely my responsibility.  
2 Appendix 3 provides an overview of local government revenue from its own sources for 2002 and 2003. 
3 This section is based on Fjeldstad (2004). 
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trustworthiness, plus the perception that others are doing their share, can induce people to 
become ‘contingent consenters’ who co-operate even when their short-term interest would 
make free-riding the individual’s best option. 4 Accordingly, citizens’ willingness to pay taxes 
voluntarily rests on the local government’s capacity to provide services and its demonstrated 
readiness to secure the compliance of the otherwise non-compliant. This is the perspective I 
will apply in this paper.  
 
Following the analytical approach suggested by Levi (1988, 1997), the relationship between a 
taxpayer and the local government includes at least three elements. First, there is an element 
of fiscal exchange, as payment of taxes and the provision of services may be interpreted as a 
contractual relationship between taxpayers and the local government. A citizen’s decision to 
pay derives from his/her perception that the local government is trustworthy. Second, there is 
an element of coercion, as represented by the enforcement activities of tax collectors and the 
penalties imposed on those detected for non-payment. The credibility or trustworthiness of 
the revenue administration’s sanctions against defaulters is important in this context. A third 
element is the impact of social influences and norms on the taxpayer's compliance behaviour. 
For example, attitudes toward the government may affect the taxpayer’s normative 
commitment to comply with the law. An individual's perceptions, in combination with her 
opportunities, may thus determine her current choice of whether or not to be a tax evader. 
2.1 Fiscal exchange 
Compliance can be motivated by the presence of government expenditures. Individuals may 
pay taxes because they value the goods provided by the government, recognising that their 
payments are necessary both to help finance the goods and services and to make others 
contribute (Andreoni et al. 1998; Cowell & Gordon 1988). Hence, a taxpayer may be seen as 
exchanging purchasing power in the market in return for government services. Fiscal 
exchange, however, requires trade-off gains that may be seen as prerequisites of voluntary 
compliance (Levi 1988:56). The existence of positive benefits – measured according to 
quantitative and qualitative criteria – may therefore increase the probability that taxpayers 
will comply voluntarily, without direct coercion. Most taxpayers are, of course, not able to 
assess the exact value of what they receive from the government in return for charges paid. 
However, it can be argued that the taxpayer has general impressions and attitudes concerning 
her own and others’ terms of trade with the government. If this is the case, then it is 
reasonable to assume that a taxpayer’s behaviour is affected by her satisfaction or lack of 
satisfaction with her terms of trade with the government. In psychological terms, an unfair 
tax system could lead people to ‘rationalise’ cheating. Thus, if the system of user fees is 
perceived to be unfair, non-payment may, at least partly, be regarded as an attempt by the 
citizen to adjust her terms of trade with the government.  
2.2 Coercion 
The coercive element of the taxpayer-government relationship is the focus of the classical tax 
evasion model (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972), which assumes that the taxpayer's behaviour is 
influenced by factors such as the tax rate determining the benefits of evasion, and the 
probability of detection and penalties for fraud which determine the costs. The problem is 
                                                 
4 The analytical distinction between trust and trustworthiness is clarified in Levi (1998:80): “Only persons can 
trust or be trusting, but trustworthiness can attach to either individuals or institutions.” She writes that 
institutional trustworthiness implies procedures for selecting and constraining the agents of institutions so that 
they are competent, credible, and likely to act in the interests of those being asked to trust the institution. 
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thus one of rationa l decision making under uncertainty whereby tax evasion either pays off in 
lower taxes or subjects one to sanctions. This implies that if detection is likely and penalties 
are severe few people will evade taxes.5  
 
Trust and coercion are closely linked in the new perspective on compliance and governance 
(Scholz 1998:163). The government is sometimes crucial in establishing levels of trust 
among citizens that make possible a whole range of social, political and economic 
transactions that would otherwise not be possible (Levi 2002:20). Critical to this task is its 
use of coercion to ensure that non-compliers are punished. As argued by Scholz (1998), no 
law can reshape behaviour without the backing of an effective enforcement agency. On the 
other hand, an effective enforcement agency does not deter each citizen from breaking the 
law but instead tries to provide a basis for trust by ensuring that non-compliers will be made 
to obey the law.  
 
At the same time, agencies concerned with trust aim to minimise the use of ruthless 
enforcement techniques on trustworthy citizens and ensure that enforcement procedures are 
perceived by the broader public as reasonable, fair and in accordance with the accepted 
standards of society. Therefore, in the long run trust-enhancing enforcement cannot be 
separated from legal processes and the contents of the law, since trust-based compliance is 
dependent on long-term social gains that make up for compliance costs (Scholz 1998:163). 
With reference to taxes, this implies that factors expected to affect payment are the 
knowledge that all other people have to pay, that fair and reasonable enforcement 
mechanisms ensure that there is no way of avoiding payment, and that failure to pay will be 
punished with fines or eventually the cut-off of services. 
2.3 Social influences 
The importance of social interactions in forming tastes and actions has long been stressed by 
sociologists and social psychologists (see, e.g., Hessing et al. 1988). It is reasonable to 
assume that human behaviour in the area of whether or not to pay taxes is influenced by 
social interactions much in the same way as other forms of behaviour. Compliance behaviour 
and attitudes towards the tax system may thus be affected by the behaviour of an individual’s 
reference group such as relatives, neighbours, friends and political associates. Consequently, 
we may argue that if a taxpayer knows many people in groups important to her who do not 
pay taxes, her commitment to comply will be weaker.6 On the other hand, social relationships 
may also help deter non-payment. Individuals can be dissuaded from engaging in evasion out 
of fear of the social sanctions incurred should their action be discovered and revealed 
publicly (Grasmick & Green 1980; Grasmick & Scott 1982). Theoretical research on herd 
behaviour in economic situations (e.g., Banerjee 1992; Sah 1991) also indicates that social 
influences may affect compliance, in particular by affecting the perceived probability of 
detection and punishment. Hence, evidence suggests that perceptions about the honesty of 
others may play an important role in compliance behaviour.  
 
                                                 
5 Nearly all economic approaches to tax evasion are based on this economics-of-crime framework. Co well 
(1990) provides a review of this literature. 
6 One of the most consistent findings in survey research in Western countries about taxpayer attitudes and 
behaviour is that those who report compliance believe that their peers and friends (and taxpayers in general) 
comply, whereas those who report cheating believe that others cheat (see Yankelovich et al. 1984). 
Furthermore, it has been found that interpersonal networks act to reduce an individual’s fear of governmental 
sanctions (Mason 1987).  
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Furthermore, evidence from behavioural science suggests that greater individual participation 
in the decision process will foster an increased level of compliance (Lewis et al. 1995; 
Hessing et al. 1992). This is partly because participation implies some commitment to the 
institution and such commitment in turn requires behaviour that is consistent in words and 
actions. Thus, we may expect that compliance is higher when taxpayers feel that they have a 
voice in the way their taxes will be spent, for instance, whether a share of the charges paid is 
retained in the local community. Another dimension by which social commitment may be 
affected by government actions is related to the level of popular support for the government. 
A government’s lack of legitimacy almost by definition diminishes the moral justification for 
obeying its laws. In contrast, widespread support tends to legitimise the public sector and 
may thus impose a socia l norm in favour of paying taxes.  
3 The survey 
The survey was conducted in October 2003 and comprised 1260 respondents in Bagamoyo 
DC, Ilala MC, Iringa DC, Kilosa DC, Moshi DC and Mwanza CC. It included respondents 
from 42 villages/mtaas, all located in different wards, some of which were located close to 
and others more distant from the council headquarters.  
3.1 The case councils 
The six case councils were selected on the basis of the following criteria: 
· variations in resource bases;  
· rural-urban variations;  
· degree of inclusion in the LGRP;  
· degree of donor presence or support; and  
· composition of political parties. 
 
Three of the case councils were part of the initial phase 1 of the local government reform, 
i.e., Ilala MC, Iringa DC and Mwanza CC (table 1).  
 
Table 1: Profile of the six case councils 
Council Region Council area 
size (sqkm) 
Population 
(2002) 
Major economic sectors Part of Phase 1 
of the LGRP 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Coast 9,842 230,164 Agriculture No 
Ilala MC Dar es Salaam  210 637,573 Services, trade, 
manufacturing, agriculture 
Yes 
Iringa DC* Iringa - 245,623 Agriculture  Yes 
Kilosa DC Morogoro 14,245 489,513 Agriculture No 
Moshi DC Kilimanjaro 1,713 402,431 Agriculture, tourism No 
Mwanza CC Mwanza 1,324 476,646 Agriculture, fishery, 
services 
Yes 
* Iringa DC was split into two districts in 2004, i.e. Iringa DC and Kilolo DC. The area of the two districts 
combined is 28,457 sqkm.  
Source: URT (2003).  
3.2 The sample 
The survey covered 210 households from 7 wards in each of the six case councils. Some 
wards were located close to and others more distant from the council headquarters. In 2002, 
the research team had identified two case wards for in-depth fieldwork study in each of the 
six case councils. The survey sampling procedure ensured that the pre-identified case wards 
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were automatically included. The remaining five wards were randomly selected based on the 
criteria of rural-urban settlement and distance from the council headquarters. In each case 
ward, a village/mtaa had also been pre- identified for in-depth study. These pre-selected 
villages/mtaa were automatically included in the sample. The rest of the villages were 
selected using the same formula as for wards. The villages constitute the primary sampling 
units. Appendix 1 gives a list of the surveyed wards, and appendix 2 a list of the 
villages/mtaa included in the survey.  
 
30 respondents were selected per village. Since the selection of wards and villages was 
random, except for the pre- identified case areas, respondent households were also randomly 
picked from the village/mtaa register. In each identified respondent household, we picked 
any adult (over 18 years) as the appropriate respondent. Obviously, dominance of household 
heads and spouses is always difficult to avoid in this approach. 
 
Further details on the sample include: 
· 53% of the respondents are men and 47% women;  
 
· 71% of all respondents are married;  
 
· 64% of all respondents were born in the council in which they now live;  
 
· almost 60% of the respondents are Christians and almost 40% Muslims, while 
traditional religions are only (openly) practised by two respondents;  
 
· 28% of the respondents were between 18-29 years of age, 47% between 30-49 years, 
and 25% 50 years and above; 
 
· the literacy rate was 87% of all respondents, which corresponds to the share of the 
respondents with no formal education; 
 
· almost 70% of the respondents had only primary school education, 11% secondary 
school, 2% college or university education, while about 3% had vocational/adult 
education. 
 
The main occupations of the respondents and the principal sources of income of their 
households are presented in table 2. Almost 60% (747 persons) of the respondents are self-
employed in agriculture. Agriculture is also the principal source of income in the 
respondents’ households. Thereafter follows self-employment in other sectors, including 
trade and commerce, which 28% of the respondents (369 people) report as their main 
occupation and the principal source of income for the household (357 people). Only 23 
respondents (2%) are public sector employees. Wages from the public sector is the major 
household income in as few as 3 households. 
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Table 2:  Main occupation and principal source of income in the respondents’ 
households (number of respondents) 
Principal source of income for household 
Self-employed Wage-employee 
Main occupation Agriculture 
Trade and 
commerce Other 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Other 
(NGO, 
etc.) 
Transfer 
from 
relatives Total 
Agriculture 692 12 30 2 5 - 6 747 
Trade and 
commerce 10 70 3 1 - - 1 85 
Self-
employed 
 
Other 40 5 211 4 1 1 2 264 
Private 
sector - - 1 41 - - - 42 
Public 
sector 1 - - - 22 - - 23 
Wage 
employee 
Other 
(NGO, etc.) 1  1 - - 11 - 13 
Unemployed 6 13 11 7 3  46 86 
Total 750 100 257 55 31 12 55 1260 
3.3 The questionnaire 
The respondents were grouped according to socio-economic characteristics such as age, 
gender, size of household, education, occupation etc. Based on the theoretical framework 
outlined in section 2, the survey included questions on citizens’ views on:  
· taxation and tax evasion;    
· who pays and why;  
· service delivery;  
· major problems in tax collection; 
· who is to blame for poor tax collection; and  
· measures required to improve revenue collection. 
3.4 Data analysis 
The limitations of survey methods are acknowledged, yet more rigorous methods were found 
unsuitable in this particular research effort. Although the survey questions do not cover the 
whole range of possible choices by taxpayers, they probably represent many of the most 
important choices and decisions.  
 
The statistical analysis consisted of a step-by-step process, starting with frequencies, cross-
tabulations combining bi- and multivariables, and, finally, an exploratory analysis of the 
respondents’ perceptions on taxation and factors explaining tax compliance. No findings of 
statistical significance are generated in this exploratory stage of the analysis except for 
generating suggested explanations for the reported compliance behaviour and respondents’ 
views on taxation. Hence, although the analysis developed in the following sections is limited 
by the stage of the research process, it has a more general interest and application. 
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4 Results 
This section first provides a descriptive presentation of the characteristics of those who pay 
local government taxes, fees and charges (i.e., compliers), and then proceeds to present 
perceptions on why (some) people pay, including the credibility of the enforcement 
mechanisms, the impacts of others’ compliance behaviour, and the linkages between tax 
compliance and service delivery.  
4.1 Who pays? 
In the total sample, almost 59% report paying taxes and/or fees (table 3). The most frequently 
cited tax types are property tax, water charges and non-fee school contributions. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that reported tax payments may differ from actual payments. For 
instance, it is not uncommon that some people overstate their compliance. But the aggregate 
compliance rate in the sample of almost 60% does not diverge substantially from findings 
from previous studies (e.g. Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001). Moreover, the survey was carried 
out three months after the development levy was abolished. Since the development levy 
created a lot of tension and conflict between taxpayers and the council, people might have 
been more willing to speak the ‘truth’ after the abolition of the levy.  
 
Table 3: Payment of taxes, fees and charges (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
 
Ilala 
MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC 
Total 
Yes 64.3 53.3 56.7 69.5 54.3 54.3 58.7 Do you pay any taxes, 
fees or charges? 
No 35.7 46.7 43.3 30.5 45.7 45.7 41.3 
 
 
Table 3 shows, however, quite substantial differences between the six case councils with 
respect to tax payment. While almost 64% report having paid taxes in Ilala MC, only 53% 
gave this answer in Bagamoyo DC. This difference is not surprising given the rural-urban 
divide with respect to the coverage of taxes, fees and charges. But in this perspective it is 
surprising that only 54% of the respondents in Mwanza CC report that they pay taxes.  
 
The survey data show only minor differences between male and female respondents with 
respect to declared tax payment. Neither do different religious beliefs matter with respect to 
claimed tax compliance. The same applies to whether the respondent is born in the case 
council or is a migrant. However, age and education matter. With respect to age, a larger 
share of the middle-aged group (30-49 years of age) claim to pay taxes (table 4), which is not 
surprising since a larger share of this age group is expected to have a taxable income 
compared to the two other age groups. 
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Table 4: Age and tax payment (as a % of the respondents) 
Age 
 18 - 29 30-49 50 and above Total 
Yes 52.7 62.1 59.2 58.7 
Do you pay any taxes, fees or charges? No 47.3 37.9 40.8 41.3 
 
Admitted tax compliance also increases with the level of education, and is significantly 
higher among respondents who have completed college or university (table 5). Again, this is 
not surprising since we would expect that people with higher education were relatively better 
off than other groups and more integrated into the formal and taxable economy.  
 
Table 5: Education and tax payment (as a % of the respondents) 
Education 
 
No formal 
schooling Primary Secondary 
College/ 
university 
Vocational/ 
adult 
education Total 
Yes 52.9 58.4 63.6 75.0 61.9 58.7 Do you pay any 
taxes, fees or 
charges? No 47.1 41.6 36.4 25.0 38.1 41.3 
4.2 Why people pay 
When asked why people pay taxes and fees, only 23% of the respondents said that it was 
because people anticipated public services, and less than 10% believed that it was because 
people felt obligations towards the government (table 6). The majority of the respondents 
said people paid taxes because they ‘wanted to avoid disturbances’ (46% of the total sample). 
This response indicates that the revenue collection regime is considered to be harsh and 
unpleasant by many respondents. However, we observe substantial differences among the 
case councils in this respect. While less than 39% of the respondents in Ilala MC gave this 
answer, as many as 57% had this view in Kilosa DC. Previous studies have shown that the 
tax collection regime in Kilosa is perceived by many residents in Kilosa DC to be harsh (e.g. 
Fjeldstad, 2001). However, for comparative purposes we do not have sufficiently detailed 
information about how tax enforcement is actually carried out in the other case councils.   
 
Table 6: Why people pay taxes (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
Description 
Ilala 
MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC 
Total 
They will avoid 
disturbances 
38.6 43.3 57.1 53.8 39.0 41.4 45.6 
They anticipate public 
services 
25.7 22.9 20.0 18.6 23.3 25.2 22.6 
They have no 
opportunity to evade 
13.3 10.0 6.2 10.0 13.3 6.7 9.9 
Feel obligations 
towards the government 
11.4 8.1 11.4 12.4 4.8 9.5 9.6 
Others 4.3 2.4 0.5 1.9 8.6 5.7 3.9 
Major 
reasons why 
people pay 
taxes 
Don't know 6.7 13.3 4.8 3.3 11.0 11.4 8.4 
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On the question of why (some) people pay taxes, the survey data show some differences 
between age groups, the respondents’ level of education and whether the respondent is born 
in or has migrated to the case council. For instance, a larger share of the youngest age group 
(47.3%) say that people pay because they will avoid disturbances (table 7). This is consistent 
with previous studies, which found that especially young and relatively poor men were 
exposed to harsh enforcement of local taxes, in particular the development levy (Fjeldstad & 
Semboja, 2001). Moreover, the data show that a larger share of the respondents in the oldest 
age group perceives that people pay taxes because they anticipate public services. 
 
Table 7: Major reasons why people pay taxes (as a % of age groups) 
Age group 
 Major reasons why people pay taxes 18 - 29 30-49 50 and above Total 
Avoid disturbances  47.3 45.8 43.0 45.6 
Anticipate public services 19.3 23.7 24.3 22.6 
No opportunity to evade 10.6 10.8 7.4 9.9 
Obligations towards the government 6.7 11.1 10.0 9.6 
Others 3.6 3.0 5.8 3.9 
Don't know 12.3 5.6 9.4 8.4 
 
The higher the level of education, the more likely it is that the respondent either anticipates 
reciprocal services for his/her tax payment or feels an obligation to the government (table 8). 
 
Table 8: Major reasons why people pay taxes (as a % of education levels) 
Level of education 
Major reasons why people pay 
taxes 
No formal 
schooling Primary Secondary 
College/ 
universit
y 
Vocational/ 
adult 
education Total 
Avoid disturbances 48.8 45.9 40.6 32.1 50.0 45.6 
Anticipate public services 15.7 24.2 21.7 25.0 19.0 22.6 
No opportunity to evade 7.6 10.4 11.2 10.7 4.8 9.9 
Obligations towards the 
government 7.0 8.8 13.3 21.4 16.7 9.6 
Others 2.3 3.8 6.3 10.7 - 3.9 
Don't know 18.6 6.9 7.0 - 9.5 8.4 
 
The survey data also show that respondents who have migrated to the case councils are more 
likely to pay taxes for other reasons than simply to avoid disturbances, relatively to people 
born in the area (table 9). This may be a reflection of the fact that migrants in the sample 
have a relatively higher education and also have a higher average age than respondents who 
are born in the council. 
 
Table 9: Major reasons why people pay taxes (as a %, disaggregated according to 
whether the respondent is born in or has migrated to the council) 
Was the respondent 
born in the council? 
Major reasons why people pay taxes Yes No Total 
Avoid disturbances  49.0 39.4 45.6 
Anticipate public services 22.1 23.6 22.6 
No opportunity to evade 8.9 11.8 9.9 
Obligations towards the government 8.6 11.4 9.6 
Others 3.3 4.9 3.9 
Don't know 8.1 8.9 8.4 
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Interestingly, only 38.6% of the respondents in Kilosa DC said that they agreed with the 
statement that ‘people would evade paying taxes if possible’ (table 10). In contrast, as many 
as 59% in Moshi DC and 58.1% in Mwanza CC gave this answer.  
 
Table 10: Tax evasion (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
 
Ilala 
MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC 
Total 
Agree 48.6 48.6 38.6 37.1 59.0 58.1 48.3 
50-50 9.5 11.0 10.5 10.0 7.6 9.5 9.7 
Disagree 34.3 32.4 48.1 43.8 25.7 26.7 35.2 
Would people evade 
taxation if possible 
Don't know 7.6 8.1 2.9 9.0 7.6 5.7 6.8 
 
 
The responses on this question, however, differ substantially between the age groups.  A 
larger share of the respondents in the youngest age group agree with the statement that people 
would evade paying taxes if possible compared to the older respondents (table 11).  
 
Table 11: Tax evasion (as a % of age groups) 
Age group 
Would taxpayers evade taxation if possible? 18 - 29 30-49 50 and above 
Agree 51.3 50.2 41.4 
50-50 7.8 9.4 12.3 
Disagree 32.2 36.0 36.9 
Don't know 8.7 4.4 9.4 
 
There are also differences of view between respondents who are born in the case councils and 
those who have migrated to the area. In aggregate, a larger share of the migrants agrees with 
the statement that people would evade taxes if possible. But the longer a ‘migrant’ has lived 
in the area, the more likely he/she is to have views on taxation similar to those who are born 
in the area (table 12). This may reflect the existence of a ‘socialisation process’, and when a 
‘migrant’ has lived in an area for some years it does not make much sense to distinguish 
between ‘migrants’ and ‘natives’.   
 
Table 12: Tax evasion (disaggregated according to how long the respondent has lived in 
the case council, as a %) 
For how long has the respondent lived in the council? 
Would taxpayers evade taxation if possible? 
0-1 
year 
2-5 
years 
6-9 
years 10 years plus Native 
Agree 45.5 65.9 59.3 49.8 45.4 
50-50 9.1 7.1 13.0 11.6 9.1 
Disagree 30.3 24.7 25.9 30.7 38.6 
Don't know 15.2 2.4 1.9 7.9 6.9 
Number of respondents  33 85 54 277 811 
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4.3 Problems in tax collection 
The most serious problem hampering tax collection, according to citizens’ perceptions, is that 
taxes collected are not spent on public services (table 13). More than 58% of the respondents 
in the sample had this view. Thereafter follow ‘too high taxes/fees’ (47.9%) and ‘dishonest 
collectors’ (45.7%) as the second and third major problems. This reflects a deep distrust 
among citizens on the local governments’ ability or motivation to provide services. The 
perception of dishonest collectors adds to this distrust, although there are substantial 
differences between the six councils in this respect. For instance, while 65% of the 
respondents in Bagamoyo DC believe that taxes collected are not spent on public services, 
the corresponding figure for Iringa is 45%.  And while 51% of the respondents in Bagamoyo 
DC agree that tax collectors are dishonest, the figure for Iringa DC is 33%.  Surprisingly, 
only 28.6% of the respondents consider taxpayers’ unwillingness to pay to be a major 
problem. Nor is dishonesty among elected local leaders perceived to be a major problem.  
 
Table 13: Major problems in tax collection (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
Description Ilala 
MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC 
Total 
Agree 62.9 65.2 48.1 44.8 68.1 61.4 58.4 
50-50 13.3 11.9 18.1 26.2 5.2 9.0 14.0 
Tax revenues 
not spent on 
public services Disagree 14.3 10.0 13.8 12.4 7.6 11.9 11.7 
Agree 51.9 51.9 46.2 30.5 52.9 53.8 47.9 
50-50 12.9 17.1 11.4 29.0 10.5 11.9 15.5 
Too high tax/fee 
rates 
Disagree 14.8 14.8 25.2 21.4 17.1 18.6 18.7 
Agree 53.8 51.4 40.0 33.3 49.5 46.2 45.7 
50-50 20.0 16.2 14.3 30.5 12.4 17.6 18.5 
Dishonest 
collectors  
Disagree 14.3 17.6 22.9 17.1 13.8 11.9 16.3 
Agree 50.5 44.3 28.6 23.3 41.4 45.2 38.9 
50-50 15.2 16.2 13.3 26.7 14.3 13.3 16.5 
Too many 
taxes/fees 
Disagree 16.7 20.5 40.5 28.1 25.2 22.9 25.6 
Agree 43.3 36.2 33.3 29.0 41.0 46.2 38.2 
50-50 20.0 21.4 20.0 23.3 21.0 21.0 21.1 
Harassment by 
tax collectors 
Disagree 23.8 27.6 29.5 30.5 16.7 9.5 22.9 
Agree 31.0 28.1 22.9 31.4 30.0 28.1 28.6 
50-50 19.0 21.0 22.9 17.6 15.7 21.0 19.5 
Tax payers 
unwilling to pay 
taxes Disagree 35.7 36.7 39.5 36.7 36.7 34.8 36.7 
Agree 21.0 17.1 29.5 21.0 28.1 23.3 23.3 
50-50 23.8 24.8 13.8 23.3 28.6 24.3 23.1 
Dishonest local 
government 
elected leaders Disagree 39.0 38.1 38.6 35.2 15.7 24.3 31.8 
Agree 15.7 11.9 12.4 11.0 22.4 15.7 14.8 
50-50 15.7 17.6 10.0 15.2 19.5 19.0 16.2 
Dishonest 
parliamentarians 
Disagree 49.5 44.8 50.0 48.6 19.0 33.3 40.9 
4.4 Tax compliance and service delivery 
The survey data show that the majority of the respondents consider poor public services to be 
the most important explanatory factor behind poor tax compliance (table 14). First, only 9% 
of all the respondents agree with the statement that most of the tax revenues collected in the 
area where they live are used to provide services. In Kilosa DC only 2.4% of the respondents 
agree, while almost 50% say tha t taxes are not used at all to provide services.  
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Second, the majority of all respondents (51%) agree that people should refuse to pay taxes 
until services improve. In Moshi DC, however, this percentage is as high as 66%, compared 
to about 35% in Iringa DC, which may reflect the political opposition’s stronghold in Moshi.   
 
Third, 73% of all respondents say they are willing to pay more taxes if public services are 
improved. There are, however, significant differences between the six case councils in this 
respect. The respondents in Iringa DC are least inclined to increase tax payments willingly in 
exchange for further service improvements. Surprisingly, given the strong position of the 
opposition, the respondents in Moshi DC are those most positive towards this hypothetical 
question. But the response may also reflect a situation in which poor service delivery is a way 
taxpayers legitimise non-compliance.   
 
Fourth, almost 75% of the respondents agree that people should contribute to improved 
services through self-help activities, though there are large variations across councils. But 
there are substantial differences between the councils in this respect. While more than 90% of 
the respondents in Kilosa DC and Iringa DC are positive towards self-help in improving 
service delivery, only 56.2% of the respondents in Ilala MC are in favour of the self-help 
approach. These differences might reflect the fact that various self-help and matching 
schemes have had some positive impacts on service delivery in Iringa (TASAF) and Kilosa 
(CIS), while they have been less prevalent in Ilala. The rural-urban divide most likely also 
reflects the difficulty in mobilising urban dwellers for community development initiatives 
due to the high mobility and turnover of residents. Hence, neighbours often know each other 
less well in urban settings compared to rural communities. But there are also differences 
across rural councils. In Moshi DC, the support for self-help is lower (69%) than in the other 
district councils. This might be due  to local politics, which may become a hindrance for self-
help. According to information collected during fieldwork in Moshi DC in August 2003, 
people from the opposition were allegedly saying that the citizens should not contribute to 
development projects since services ‘should be provided by the government’.   
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Table 14: Views on tax collection and service provision (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
Description 
Ilala MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC Total 
Yes, mostly 9.0 9.5 2.4 11.0 9.5 12.9 9.0 
Partly 23.3 23.8 14.3 21.0 15.7 22.9 20.2 
Not at all 33.8 31.9 49.5 32.4 38.1 32.9 36.4 
Are tax 
revenues 
collected in 
the area used 
to provide 
public 
services? 
Don't know 33.8 34.8 33.8 35.7 36.7 31.4 34.4 
Agree 51.4 49.0 39.5 35.2 66.2 64.3 51.0 
Partly 6.2 8.1 8.1 9.0 9.0 6.7 7.9 
Disagree 38.1 35.2 47.6 48.1 18.6 24.3 35.3 
Should people 
refuse to pay 
taxes until 
they get better 
services? Don't know 4.3 7.6 4.8 7.6 6.2 4.8 5.9 
Yes 72.9 65.7 72.9 59.0 82.4 83.3 72.7 
No 25.7 28.6 25.2 37.6 14.3 11.4 23.8 
Willing to pay 
more taxes if 
public 
services 
improved? 
Don't know 1.4 5.7 1.9 3.3 3.3 5.2 3.5 
Agree 56.2 70.0 90.5 92.9 69.0 71.0 74.9 
Partly 13.8 5.7 3.8 3.3 12.4 13.3 8.7 
Disagree 29.5 18.1 4.8 2.4 14.8 11.4 13.5 
Should people 
contribute to 
better social 
services 
through more 
self-help 
activities? 
Don't know 0.5 6.2 1.0 1.4 3.8 4.3 2.9 
 
Citizens’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction with service provision, however, varies substantially 
between various services. Peoples’ views may also reflect that they know that some services 
are provided by the central government (e.g. education) and others are the responsibility of 
the local authorities (e.g. clean water supply). Table 15 shows the share of all respondents, by 
council and for the whole sample, who say they are satisfied with the various services listed. 
As many as 70% of the respondents say they are satisfied with primary schools, while only 
22% say they are satisfied with the water supply and road maintenance. Law and order 
(18.6%) and the market place (13.2%) also score low. People are least satisfied with garbage 
collection (7.1%) and agricultural extension services (7.9%). But again there are significant 
differences between the councils. For instance, in Bagamoyo DC only 10% of the 
respondents say they are satisfied with the water supply, compared to 35.2% in Iringa DC. 
With respect to law and order, only 9.5% in Moshi DC say they are satisfied, while the 
corresponding figure for Iringa DC is 27.6%. In contrast, 24.8% of the respondents in Moshi 
DC say they are satisfied with the market place, compared to only 3.8% in Kilosa DC and 
4.8% in Iringa DC.  
 
Hence, if the problem of tax compliance is to be addressed by improving services, this may 
require different measures in different councils. For instance, in Bagamoyo DC an 
appropriate policy might be to focus on improved water supply for a period, while law and 
order may be a key issue in Moshi DC. Improvement of market places may seem to be 
important in Kilosa DC, while better agricultural extension should be a priority in Iringa DC.  
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Table 15: Service satisfaction (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
Description 
Ilala 
MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC 
 
Total 
Primary school Satisfied 68.6 61.4 83.3 73.3 66.7 67.1 70.1 
Dispensary  Satisfied 45.7 36.7 34.8 36.7 35.2 38.1 37.9 
Secondary school Satisfied 19.0 21.0 29.0 34.3 16.2 21.4 23.5 
Water supply  Satisfied 18.1 10.0 21.0 35.2 18.6 30.0 22.1 
Road maintenance Satisfied 25.7 27.1 13.3 27.6 13.8 24.8 22.1 
Sanitation Satisfied 23.8 16.7 20.5 26.2 21.0 18.6 21.1 
Electricity Satisfied 23.8 10.0 20.0 15.2 27.6 19.0 19.3 
Law and order Satisfied 21.9 12.4 24.8 27.6 9.5 15.2 18.6 
Health clinic Satisfied 25.2 23.8 5.2 15.7 9.5 13.3 15.5 
Market place Satisfied 19.0 11.9 3.8 4.8 24.8 14.8 13.2 
Agricultural ext. Satisfied 1.9 8.1 12.4 5.7 10.0 9.0 7.9 
Garbage collection Satisfied 19.0 5.7 1.0 - 7.1 10.0 7.1 
4.5 Whom to blame for poor tax collection 
Table 16 presents the percentage of all respondents, by council and in total, that agree, agree 
partly (50-50) or disagree as to whether the given groups/institutions are most to blame for 
the poor tax collection. Other respondents either did not know or had no view. Tax collectors 
(53.7% of the respondents) and council employees (49.3%) are those most frequently 
blamed. These views cross-cut all the case councils, although the share of the respondents 
who blame tax collectors most is lower in Iringa DC (40.5%) than in the other councils 
(higher than 50%). Only 20.4% of the respondents agree with the statement that taxpayers are 
most to blame. These views are consistent with those previously reported in section 3.3 (table 
6), where dishonest tax collectors are perceived to be a major problem in tax collection. 
Fjeldstad (2001) argues that coercive tax collection has important consequences for citizens’ 
rights and for the democratisation process. If taxpayers’ rights are unclear for both taxpayers 
and tax authorities, tax compliance and accountability will be affected. Moreover, as long as 
coercion is accepted as an integral part of tax collection it is unlikely that state-society 
relations can become more accountable and democratic. 
 
The lack of trust in tax collectors has been documented in previous studies (Tripp, 1997; 
Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2000; Kelsall, 2000). In particular, the collection of the development 
levy often led to conflicts and tensions between collectors and citizens. Since this survey was 
carried out only a few months after the abolition of development levy in June 2003, citizens’ 
perceptions of tax collectors may still reflect their views based on their experiences with 
development levy collection. If this is the case, we may expect that taxpayer-tax collector 
relations will improve. However, in the two urban councils, Ilala MC and Mwanza CC, the 
development levy was not an important revenue base. In these councils the poll tax mainly 
covered public and formal sector employees, whose payment of the levy was deducted from 
their salaries by the employer with limited contact between collectors and taxpayers. Hence, 
taxpayers’ lack of trust in collectors in Ilala MC and Mwanza CC is most likely related to 
other factors than the now abolished development levy.  
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Table 16: Who is most to blame for poor tax collection (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
Description Ilala 
MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC 
Total 
Agree 57.6 56.2 55.2 40.5 53.8 58.6 53.7 
50-50 16.2 13.3 10.5 21.0 8.6 12.9 13.7 
Tax collectors/fee 
collectors 
Disagree 16.7 14.8 21.4 21.9 21.4 19.0 19.2 
Agree 48.1 48.1 45.2 40.5 55.2 58.6 49.3 
50-50 20.5 14.3 9.0 15.2 12.4 10.5 13.7 
Council 
employees 
Disagree 17.6 20.0 30.5 29.0 16.2 19.5 22.1 
Agree 50.0 46.2 30.0 30.0 43.3 56.2 42.6 
50-50 16.7 9.5 5.2 11.9 7.1 6.2 9.4 
Central 
government 
authorities/TRA Disagree 21.4 21.0 47.1 39.5 22.4 23.3 29.1 
Agree 42.4 37.1 38.1 32.4 39.0 50.0 39.8 
50-50 20.0 16.2 8.6 18.6 14.8 11.9 15.0 
Licences and 
permits officers 
Disagree 25.2 27.1 33.8 32.4 29.5 26.2 29.0 
Agree 26.7 28.1 49.0 34.8 41.4 46.2 37.7 
50-50 23.3 22.4 10.0 21.0 19.5 13.8 18.3 
Local 
government 
elected leaders Disagree 35.7 30.5 26.7 27.1 21.0 27.1 28.0 
Agree 18.1 19.5 15.7 16.7 28.6 33.8 22.1 
50-50 18.1 11.4 8.6 10.5 9.5 9.5 11.3 Parliamentarians 
Disagree 45.7 39.0 54.8 51.9 23.8 35.2 41.7 
Agree 28.1 21.0 12.4 19.0 17.1 24.8 20.4 
50-50 17.6 20.5 16.7 16.7 17.1 17.1 17.6 
Tax payers/fee 
payers 
Disagree 44.3 42.4 56.7 47.1 48.6 48.6 47.9 
4.6 Citizens’ views on how to improve the system 
In a series of questions, the survey addresses the issue on how to improve the present system. 
The questions address matters such as where the respondents think revenues are least likely 
to be misused, and actions to be taken to reduce the misuse.  
 
As many as 27.4% of all respondents think that misuse of funds is unavoidable, though there 
are large variations across councils (table 17). While only 11% of respondents in Iringa DC 
see misuse as unavoidable, as many as 41% percent in Moshi DC hold this view. The 
discouraging data from Moshi DC may reflect the high political tensions in the council 
between opposition and ruling party politicians. In general, respondents favour village 
authorities over ward, council and parliamentarians to allocate tax revenue.  
 
Table 17: Where is misuse of tax revenue least likely? (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
 
Ilala MC 
Bagamoy
o DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanz
a CC 
Total 
Village authorities 6.7 9.0 32.4 18.1 7.6 16.2 15.0 
Ward office 10.0 3.3 10.0 13.8 8.6 14.8 10.1 
Council authorities 8.6 11.4 5.7 20.5 2.9 2.4 8.6 
Service facility  5.7 10.0 8.1 4.3 6.2 7.1 6.9 
Tanzania Revenue 
Authority (TRA) 
13.3 17.6 15.2 11.9 12.9 17.6 14.8 
Misuse unavoidable 38.1 29.0 20.5 11.0 40.5 25.2 27.4 
 
Don't know 17.6 19.5 8.1 20.5 21.4 16.7 17.3 
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When asked what actions would reduce the misuse of tax revenue, as many as 40% to 50% of 
the respondents say it would not help to report this to the village authorities, the ward and 
council offices, and the police (table 18). The most frequent reason given for this attitude is 
“all civil servants are corrupt and they protect each other”. However, almost 64% of all 
respondents think that reporting the misuse of tax revenue to a journalist would help reduce 
this form of corruption. Citizens’ relatively high trust in journalists is also reported in other 
studies, for instance ESRF & FACEIT (2003).  
 
Table 18: Actions to reduce the misuse of tax revenue (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
Report to:   Ilala 
MC 
Bagamoyo 
DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwanza 
CC 
Total 
Yes 63.3 60.5 59.5 63.3 67.6 68.1 63.7 
No 27.1 25.2 25.7 24.3 15.2 20.5 23.0 Journalist 
Don't know 9.5 14.3 14.8 12.4 17.1 11.4 13.3 
Yes 43.8 50.0 49.5 64.8 41.0 48.6 49.6 
No 45.7 36.2 46.7 30.0 40.0 42.9 40.2 
Village 
authorities 
Don't know 10.5 13.8 3.8 5.2 19.0 8.6 10.2 
Yes 38.1 49.5 49.5 57.1 43.3 50.0 47.9 
No 51.9 36.7 45.7 38.1 37.6 41.0 41.8 
Ward 
office 
Don't know 10.0 13.8 4.8 4.8 19.0 9.0 10.2 
Yes 40.0 43.8 40.5 49.0 50.0 62.9 47.7 
No 50.0 41.9 52.4 45.2 30.0 27.1 41.1 
Member 
of 
Parliament Don't know 10.0 14.3 7.1 5.7 20.0 10.0 11.2 
Yes 41.9 39.5 54.8 49.0 42.4 43.8 45.2 
No 49.5 48.1 40.0 46.2 39.5 43.8 44.5 Police 
Don't know 8.6 12.4 5.2 4.8 18.1 12.4 10.2 
Yes 42.9 41.4 30.5 38.1 56.2 59.0 44.7 
No 45.7 44.3 58.1 50.0 27.1 28.6 42.3 
Political 
party 
leaders Don't know 11.4 14.3 11.4 11.9 16.7 12.4 13.0 
Yes 36.7 40.5 47.1 53.3 40.5 46.7 44.1 
No 53.3 44.8 44.8 40.5 39.0 42.4 44.1 
Council 
authorities 
Don't know 10.0 14.8 8.1 6.2 20.5 11.0 11.7 
 
When it comes to actual action taken by citizens, only 4% of all the respondents say they 
have reported a misuse of tax funds over the last two years (table 19). In Moshi DC the figure 
is only 1%. Some respondents (11%) say, however, that they are aware of other people who 
have reported the misuse of money. When it comes to why so few people take action and 
report the misuse of revenues collected, almost 21% of the respondents say that it is because 
they are scared of repercussions, and 15.2% say that such actions will not have any effect 
anyway. These figures are discouraging given the fact that the government has run extensive 
anti-corruption campaigns since 1996 and has also encouraged people to report officials who 
abuse their position for personal gain. The figures support the argument that there is an 
urgent need to take action to improve the trust relations between local authorities and 
citizens.  
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Table 19: Actual action taken to report misuse of tax money  
Council name 
Description 
Ilala MC Bagamoyo DC 
Kilosa 
DC 
Iringa 
DC 
Moshi 
DC 
Mwan
za CC 
Total 
Yes 3.8 5.2 3.3 5.2 1.0 3.3 3.7 Have you reported 
misuse of tax 
revenue in the last 
2 years No 96.2 94.8 96.7 94.8 99.0 96.7 96.3 
Yes, many persons 1.4 2.4 5.2 4.3 1.0 3.3 2.9 
Yes, only some 
persons 8.1 5.7 12.4 7.6 7.1 7.6 8.1 
No one at all 56.7 57.1 56.2 63.8 41.0 43.8 53.1 
Are you aware of 
anybody who has 
taken such action? 
Don't know 33.8 34.8 26.2 24.3 51.0 45.2 35.9 
Do not know what 
to do 12.9 18.6 15.7 24.3 7.1 6.7 14.2 
Scared of 
repercussions 22.9 18.6 24.8 26.7 12.9 19.5 20.9 
Will not have 
effect 20.0 15.2 10.0 9.5 20.5 16.2 15.2 
Don't know 1.0 4.8 5.7 3.3 0.5 1.4 2.8 
Reasons for not 
taking reporting 
misuse of tax 
money 
Not applicable 43.3 42.9 43.8 36.2 59.0 56.2 46.9 
 
To build trust, information to the public is crucial (Levi, 1998; Levi & Stoker, 2000; 
Rothstein, 2000). Citizens’ access to and right to information is often seen as a necessary 
condition to achieve accountable, transparent and participatory governance and people-
centred development (Crook & Manor, 1998; Jenkins & Goetz, 1999). Information to the 
public on tax revenues collected, financial allocations and how to report corruption are, 
however, in scarce supply, according to the survey data. Very few of the respondents have 
seen posted any information about local government finances (table 20). Less than 6% of the 
respondents say they have seen information posted on taxes and fees collected, and only 
2.5% say they have seen audited statements of council expenditure. And while only 16% of 
the respondents have seen information on how to report corruption, a large majority have 
seen posters for HIV/AIDS prevention (almost 78%). Those respondents who have heard 
about the local government reform (LGR) seem, however, to be slightly better informed than 
those who have not heard about the LGR (table 20). This is particularly evident with regard 
to information on how to report corruption, where 23% of those who have heard about LGR 
have received such information, compared to 10% of those who have not heard about LGR. 
 
Table 20: Access to information (as a % of the respondents) 
Have you in the last two years seen any of the following information posted in a public place? 
LG budget Taxes and fees 
collected 
Audited 
statements 
of council 
expenditure 
Financial 
allocation 
to key 
sectors 
HIV/AIDS 
prevention 
How to 
report 
corruption 
Description Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Heard about LGR 10.6 89.4 8.9 91.1 4.0 96.0 7.4 92.6 84.5 15.5 23.4 76.6 
Not heard about LGR 3.0 97.0 2.6 97.4 1.2 98.8 1.8 98.2 71.2 28.8 9.9 90.1 
Total 6.6 93.4 5.6 94.4 2.5 97.5 4.4 95.6 77.5 22.5 16.3 83.7 
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There are large variations across councils with respect to information collected on tax 
revenue (not tabled here). The respondents in Kilosa DC seem to be relatively better 
informed compared to other councils. 33.3% of the respondents in Kilosa say they have 
received information on tax revenue collected in their area. In contrast, only 5.7% of the 
respondents in Ilala MC and Mwanza CC say they are informed. The survey data do not 
provide us with an answer on why the respondents in the two urban councils are more 
ignorant on this issue than people living in rural councils. However, among those who have 
received information on tax revenue, the Village Executive Officer (VEO) is in general the 
most likely institution to have issued it. This may indicate that the VEOs in some contexts 
function as an effective channel of information between the council and citizens.  
 
How can the use of tax revenues be improved? Table 21 presents the percentage of all 
respondents, by council and in total, that agree, agree partly (50-50) or disagree on whether 
the given measures will work or not. The measures most favoured by citizens are stronger 
punishment of government employees (83%) and politicians (almost 80%), followed by more 
information to the public on the allocation of tax revenue (78%) and revenue collection 
(74%). These views cross-cut all the six case councils. From a citizen perspective the 
measures suggested for improving the use of tax revenues can all be interpreted as trust-
enhancing devices. This is in line with recent research which concludes that one of the factors 
that determine taxpayers’ compliance is whether citizens perceive the local government to be 
trustworthy and acting in their interest (Fjeldstad, 2004). In particular, three dimensions of 
trust may affect citizens’ compliance (Slemrod, 2003): (1) trust in the local government to 
use revenues to provide expected services; (2) trust in the authorities to establish fair 
procedures for revenue collection and distribution of services; and (3) trust in other citizens 
to pay their share. 
 
Table 21: Measures to improve the use of tax revenue (as a % of the respondents) 
Council name 
Description 
Ilala MC Bagamoyo DC Kilosa DC Iringa DC Moshi DC Mwanza CC 
Total 
Agree 78.1 79.5 89.5 89.0 80.0 83.3 83.3 
50-50 10.5 11.0 6.2 4.8 9.5 6.7 8.1 Stronger punishment of government employees  
Disagree 8.1 5.2 3.8 5.2 5.7 5.7 5.6 
Agree 67.6 75.2 89.0 86.7 77.1 82.4 79.7 
50-50 16.7 12.4 7.1 6.7 10.0 7.1 10.0 Stronger punishment of politicians 
Disagree 12.4 7.6 3.3 5.7 8.1 6.2 7.2 
Agree 79.0 75.2 82.9 77.1 74.8 77.1 77.7 
50-50 11.9 10.5 10.0 13.8 13.8 13.3 12.2 
More information on 
allocation of tax 
revenues Disagree 5.2 7.1 6.7 7.1 6.7 4.3 6.2 
Agree 78.1 69.5 79.5 72.4 71.9 75.2 74.4 
50-50 10.0 11.9 11.9 14.8 15.7 14.8 13.2 More information on collection 
Disagree 7.6 11.4 8.1 11.4 7.6 4.8 8.5 
Agree 12.9 21.9 24.3 21.4 17.6 16.7 19.1 
50-50 14.8 17.1 10.0 12.4 6.2 5.2 11.0 More involvement of police in tax collection 
Disagree 66.7 54.3 64.3 64.3 66.2 70.0 64.3 
Agree 12.9 21.4 21.0 15.2 15.7 20.5 17.8 
50-50 15.7 16.7 13.8 11.9 16.7 11.9 14.4 
More involvement of 
the military in tax 
collection Disagree 66.2 52.9 62.9 67.6 55.7 57.1 60.4 
Agree 14.3 8.6 3.8 7.6 14.8 19.0 11.3 
50-50 1.0 1.4 0.5 0.5 - - 0.6 More fundamental changes 
Disagree 8.6 6.7 1.4 5.7 4.3 - 4.4 
  19 
5 Concluding remarks 
The survey data show tha t citizens feel they get little in return for taxes paid. This perception 
has impacts on their willingness to pay and contributes to eroding peoples’ trust in the local 
government’s capacity to provide the expected services. The majority of the respondents said 
that “they would be willing to pay more taxes if public services were improved”. Hence, 
from a policy perspective it is a major challenge to provide better linkages between tax 
compliance and service delivery. 
 
To improve compliance it is also important to address the broader problem of free-riding. 
Some people seem to be in a position to pay, but opt for non-compliance. However, 
taxpayers’ unwillingness to pay is not perceived to be the main problem in revenue 
collection. The survey data point at misuse of tax revenues by council staff (particularly by 
tax collectors) and councillors as the major problem. Hence, stronger punishment of council 
staff and councillors whose mismanagement is detected is perceived to be a key measure for 
improving the present system.  
 
Information to the public on tax revenues collected, financial allocations and how to report 
corruption are in scarce supply, according to the survey data. Very few of the respondents 
have seen posted any information about local government finances. To build trust between 
citizens and the council, information to the public is crucial. Citizens’ access to and right to 
information on taxes collected and how revenues are spent is often seen as a necessary 
condition to achieve accountable, transparent and participatory governance and people-
centred development.  
 
Moreover, the mechanisms for enforcing compliance are not indifferent for the outcome. A 
trust-enhancing approach to improving the payment of local taxes and fees might be based on 
the proposition that citizens are likely to perceive the local government as reciprocating their 
trust when they feel they are being treated with respect. Thus, the previous fierce and 
uncompromising approaches in some rural councils to collecting the development levy may 
actually have contributed towards increasing present-day resistance by taxpayers. It is 
therefore imperative to establish mechanisms for improving relations between the local 
revenue administration and citizens. Relevant measures include improvements to the billing 
and accounting systems, establishing more accessible and efficient payment facilities, and 
strengthening the capacity to follow up cases of non-payment through fair and reasonable 
enforcement.  
 
The problems of non-payment should therefore be attacked on several fronts, including 
service delivery, better administration and information schemes, and community 
involvement. To achieve this, in-depth knowledge and data are required on payment levels 
for each village and ward, the proportion of lower local government accounts delivered, the 
number and type of complaints received, living conditions for the poorest segments of the 
population, including the elderly and unemployed, etc. Moreover, customer care must show 
that complaining will bring results. Citizens should therefore be encouraged to report defaults 
such as misappropriation of revenue and services not delivered as promised. The prompt 
redress of such complaints may help convince people that the local authority means business. 
Furthermore, citizens’ involvement in identifying problems and setting priorities may 
motivate a greater sense of community involvement. Initially, it is advisable to link payment 
directly to visible improvements in services. Finally, the co-operation between local 
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government officials, councillors and community leaders in setting common goals might be a 
crucial trust-enhancing device.  
 
The study provides us with some directions for future research. For an improved 
understanding of tax compliance behaviour in local authorities in Tanzania, there is a need 
for a more thorough examination of the concept of fairness in fiscal exchange, i.e. the 
contractual relationship between taxpayers and the government. In this context it is also 
relevant to analyse if - and when - user charges are to be preferred instead of general taxes to 
finance public services. Critical factors in this respect are citizens’ perceptions about the role 
of the state, how the tax law is administered, perceptions about enforcement and government 
trustworthiness. Furthermore, there is a need for research focusing on taxpayers’ rights in 
situations where the government - and donors - are pressing for increased domestic tax effort. 
Can compliance be established in poor countries without an extensive and costly enforcement 
apparatus, and if so, under what conditions? This question is important because it is likely that 
governments seeking power on the basis of popular consent face restrictions on their use of 
coercion in tax collection. Thus, the challenge for local government taxation in Tanzania is to 
raise domestic revenues from consenting citizens.  
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Appendix 1: Wards included in the survey 
 
Council Ward 
Bagamoyo DC DUNDA 
Bagamoyo DC KIROMO 
Bagamoyo DC KIWANGWA 
Bagamoyo DC MAGOMENI 
Bagamoyo DC MBWEWE 
Bagamoyo DC MIONO 
Bagamoyo DC UBENAZOMOZI 
  
Ilala MC BUGURUNI 
Ilala MC CHANIKA 
Ilala MC GEREZANI 
Ilala MC KINYEREZI 
Ilala MC KIPAWA 
Ilala MC KITUNDA 
Ilala MC PUGU 
  
Iringa DC IFUNDA 
Iringa DC IZAZI 
Iringa DC KALENGA  
Iringa DC KIHOROGOTA 
Iringa DC MSEKE 
Iringa DC NDULI 
Iringa DC ULANDA 
  
Kilosa DC CHANZURU 
Kilosa DC GAIRO 
Kilosa DC MAGOLE 
Kilosa DC MIKUMI 
Kilosa DC MKWATANI 
Kilosa DC RUBEHO 
Kilosa DC ZOMBO 
  
Moshi DC KAHE 
Moshi DC KIRIMA 
Moshi DC KIRUAVUNJO KUSINI 
Moshi DC MABOGINI 
Moshi DC MAKUYUNI 
Moshi DC MAMBA KUSINI 
Moshi DC OLD MOSHI 
  
Mwanza CC BUGOGWA 
Mwanza CC IGOMA 
Mwanza CC ILEMELA  
Mwanza CC ISAMILO 
Mwanza CC MIRONGO 
Mwanza CC MKOLANI 
Mwanza CC SANGABUYE 
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Appendix 2: Villages/mtaas included in the survey 
 
Council Village 
Bagamoyo DC BUMA 
Bagamoyo DC DUNDA 
Bagamoyo DC KIWANGWA 
Bagamoyo DC MAGOMENI 
Bagamoyo DC MANDERA 
Bagamoyo DC MBWEWE 
Bagamoyo DC MWIDU 
  
Ilala MC BUGURUNI MADENGE 
Ilala MC CHANIKA 
Ilala MC GEREZAN 
Ilala MC GEREZANI MASHARIKI 
Ilala MC KINYEREZI 
Ilala MC KITUNDA 
Ilala MC MOGO 
Ilala MC PUGU KAJIUNGENI 
  
Iringa DC ISMANI 
Iringa DC IZAZI 
Iringa DC KALENGA 
Iringa DC KIBEBE 
Iringa DC KIBENA 
Iringa DC NDULI 
Iringa DC TANANGOZI 
  
Kilosa DC CHANZURU 
Kilosa DC IBUTI 
Kilosa DC KWIPIPA 
Kilosa DC MABANA 
Kilosa DC MIKUMI 
Kilosa DC MTENDENI 
Kilosa DC ZOMBOLUMBO 
  
Moshi DC CHEKERENI 
Moshi DC HIMO 
Moshi DC KIRIMA JUU 
Moshi DC LEKURA 
Moshi DC MANDE 
Moshi DC ORYA 
Moshi DC UPARO 
  
Mwanza CC IGOGWE 
Mwanza CC ILEMELA  
Mwanza CC ISAMILO 
Mwanza CC KILOMBERO 
Mwanza CC MKOLANI 
Mwanza CC MTAA WA KATI 
Mwanza CC NYAFULA  
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Appendix 3: Local government own revenue sources 
    (2002 and 2003*, in mill. TSh and as a % of total revenue from their own sources) 
 
A: District case councils  Bagamoyo DC Iringa DC Kilosa DC Moshi DC 
Revenue sources 2002 % 2003 % 2002 % 2003 % 2002 % 2003 % 2002 % 2003 % 
Development levy 13.7 4.5   252.3 56.2   138.4 31.7   60.8 11.0   
Crop cess (local tax on 
agricultural products) 
25.7 8.5 39.7 10.8 42.9 9.6 57.6 23.9 104.6 24.0 18.0 15.6 201.3 36.4 158.7 36.3 
Livestock cess 0    40.3 9.0 50.1 20.8 13.2 3.0   0.4 0.1 3.0 0.7 
Business licences 68.3 22.5 73.1 19.8 32.1 7.1 34.6 14.4 36.1 8.3 30.9 26.8 51.9 9.4 27.0 6.2 
Market fees 20.7 6.8 20.0 5.4 1.8 0.4 2.1 0.9 16.2 3.7 14.9 12.9 25.2 4.6 46.2 10.6 
Other taxes 0.6 0.2 2.0 0.5 18.8 4.2 25.3 10.5 25.5 5.8 10.2 8.8 11.1 2.0 28.1 6.4 
Other fees, licences & fines 155.1 51.1 221.7 60.1 50.9 11.3 53.8 22.3 66.4 15.2 41.5 35.9 94.2 17.0 74.1 17.0 
Miscellaneous 19.5 6.4 12.4 3.4 10.1 2.2 17.2 7.2 35.6 8.2   107.4 19.4 99.6 22.8 
Total 303.6 100 368.8 100 449.2 100 240.7 100 436.1 100 115.4 100 552.5 100 436.7 100 
 
 
B: Urban case councils  Ilala MC Mwanza CC 
Revenue sources 2002 % 2003 % 2002 % 2003 % 
Development levy 36.3 0.6   279.5 13.2   
Property taxes 690.8 11.5 1,115.3 16.3 243.6 11.5 442.2 21.6 
Business licences 1,194.5 19.9 1,943.5 28.4 364.7 17.3 391.7 19.2 
City Service levy 2,044.2 34.1 2,303.9 33.6 452.9 21.5 477.9 23.4 
Other taxes 16.4 0.3 80.5 1.2 121.2 5.7 485.9 23.8 
Other fees, licences & fines 1,697.1 28.3 1,109.3 16.2 460.6 21.8 244.3 11.9 
Miscellaneous 311.3 5.2 301.3 4.4 188.4 8.9 2.5 0.1 
Total 5,990.6 100 6,853.9 100 2,111.2 100 2,044.5 100 
 
Sources: Fjeldstad et al. (2004) based on data from the councils’ ‘Abstracts of Final Accounts (2002)’ and ‘Budget Estimates (2003)’. 
 
  
Summary 
Widespread tax evasion reflected in persistent public resistance 
to pay is seen as part of the problem of raising local 
government revenues in Tanzania. Dealing with the policy 
problem of revenue enhancement and tax evasion requires 
some understanding of the factors underlying the individual’s 
decision whether to pay or evade taxes. However, the views of 
taxpayers are to a large extent ignored in this policy debate. 
What are the experiences, priorities, and recommendations of 
Tanzanian citizens with respect to payment of taxes and fees? 
What do people feel they get in return for taxes paid? And what 
do they consider to be the major challenges to improving the 
present system? Based on data from a recently conducted 
citizen survey, this paper presents the perceptions of ordinary 
people on local government taxation.  
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